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CONTEXTUALISM, ASSESSOR RELATIVISM, AND INSENSITIVE
ASSESSMENTS
ALEXANDER ALMÉR AND GUNNAR BJÖRNSSON
Introduction
Claims about what is tasty or about what might be the case are relative, some-
how, to palates and bodies of information. One standard way to account for
such relativity has been to say that the truth-conditions expressed by such
claims vary with some feature of the context in which the utterance is made,
a feature which picks out the relevant palate or body of information. For
example:
Might-C: An utterance of a sentence of the form P might be the case
is true if and only if P is compatible with the body of information
that is relevant in the context of utterance (cf. DeRose 1991, 1998;
Bach 2008; Schaffer 2009).
Tasty-C: An utterance of a sentence of the form X is tasty is true if
and only if X accords with the standard of taste that is relevant in
the context of utterance (cf. Glanzberg 2007; Schaffer 2009).
Contextualist analyses promise to capture what we are interested in when
we make epistemically modal judgments or judgments of taste. When the
gambler considers whether the next card might be an ace, she seems to be
asking whether she knows anything that rules out that it is an ace. When
we search the fridge for something tasty, we are looking for something that
accords with our palate. Recently, however, a number of authors (Mac-
Farlane 2005, 2008; Egan 2007; Egan et al. 2005; Lasersohn 2005; e.g.)
have suggested that contextualism fails to account for phenomena relating to
linguistic expressions of agreement and disagreement — what we will call
felicitous insensitive assessments — and have proposed much discussed al-
ternative analyses according to which the truth of claims of the form P might
be the case or X is tasty is relative to contexts of assessment, rather than
contexts of utterance.
In this paper, we provide one hitherto overlooked way in which contex-
tualists can embrace the phenomenon by slightly modifying an assumption
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that has remained in the background in most of the debate over contextual-
ism and relativism. Finally, we briefly argue that the resulting contextualist
account is at least as plausible as the relativist alternative and should be care-
fully considered before contextualism is abandoned for relativism.
The challenge: insensitive assessments and assessor-relativism
The challenge against contextualism that we are concerned with builds on
the existence of felicitous insensitive assessments. For “might” and “tasty”,
these are cases where (i) the speaker, S, has judged that something is the case
based on information available to S in the context of utterance, or judged that
something is tasty based on its accord with S’s own palate, but where (ii) it is
linguistically appropriate for an assessor, A, to assess S’s judgment based on
information available in A’s context, or based on A’s palate rather than based
on information available in S’s context or on S’s palate. Here are some (ap-
parent) examples:
Might:
Alice has asked whether anyone has seen her keys. Bill, who left
them in the car, answers:
(1) “The keys might be in the car.”
Unknown to Alice and Bill, the neighbourhood girl, Emily, has just
stolen the keys from the car and is hiding behind a bush, listening to
the conversation. Here are two possible thoughts of hers in response
to Bill’s utterance:
(2) “No, they can’t be, because I have them here.”
(3) *“That’s true, but I have them here.”
Tasty:
Sam, seen by the dining table in a television documentary:
(4) “Fish sticks are really tasty!”
Compare two possible comments by little John, who is watching the
documentary and really dislikes fish sticks:
(5) “No, they are disgusting!”
(6) *“Yes, but they are disgusting!”
Assume that nothing Bill and Alice know rules out that the keys are in the
car and assume that fish sticks really do accord with Sam’s palate: then (1)
and (4) seem true according to Might-C and Tasty-C. Still, the expressions of
disagreement or denial of (2) and (5) seem felicitous; whereas the agreement
expressed by (3) and (6) seem odd. This is contrary to what Might-C and
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Tasty-C seem to predict. Moreover, cases like these are easily multiplied, and
can involve a variety of what we might call “assessment phrases”, linguistic
constructions that seem to imply assessments of utterances as true or false,
and which are typically used to express agreement or disagreement with a
stated or believed opinion: “that is true”, “that is false”, “you are wrong
about that”, “you are mistaken”, “I was wrong”, “I agree”, “I disagree”,
“yes”, “no”, “she knows that” or “it is not the case that”.1
“Relativists” like Andy Egan, John MacFarlane and Peter Lasersohn think
that the best way to accommodate linguistically appropriate insensitive as-
sessments is by introducing a notion of assessment-relative utterance truth.
This allows for the following alternatives to Might-C and Tasty-C:
Might-R: An utterance of a sentence of the form P might be the case
is true relative to a context of assessment if and only if P is compat-
ible with the information available in that context (cf. MacFarlane
2005; Egan 2007).
Tasty-R: An utterance of a sentence of the form X is tasty is true
relative to a context of assessment if and only if X accords with the
standard of taste of that context. (cf. Lasersohn 2005).
That seems to straightforwardly account for insensitive assessments. When
Bill has said that Alice’s keys might be in the car and Emily says to her-
self, “No, they can’t be, because I got them here”, Emily’s utterance seems
felicitous because Bill’s utterance is false relative to Emily’s information.
Similarly, John’s rejection of Sam’s claim that fish sticks are tasty seems
felicitous because fish sticks are not tasty according to John’s standard.
At the same time, the introduction of assessor-relative utterance truth
changes a fundamental semantic concept and forces us to revise not only
logic (MacFarlane 2005) but also a number of assumptions connecting se-
mantic analysis to psychology and linguistic behaviour. For example, the
conception of assertion as a speech act concerned with stating what is true
at the context of utterance must be modified to fit the relativist framework
(see Egan 2007 for a discussion); also the notion of disagreement, which
is closely connected to that of assertion, must be redefined (see Macfarlane
1As is generally acknowledged, some assessment phrases tend to produce less clear in-
tuitions than others. In particular, many think that it would be less natural for Emily to reply
by “That’s false, I have them here.” (e.g. von Fintel and Gillies 2008, p. 84). As Egan (2007,
p. 4 n5) points out, that might well be due to a conversational implication that the speaker
had performed bad reasoning.
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2007 for a discussion).2 For these reasons, the adoption of a relativistic se-
mantics is not a step that should be taken lightly.
What is it to assess an utterance?
If one is wary of assessment-relative truth and wants to defend contextual-
ism, there are two ways one might want to go. The first is to deny that there
are felicitous insensitive assessments and to explain away their appearance.3
Since we think that there are such assessments, we want to explore the sec-
ond: to show how they can be accommodated within contextualism.
What distinguishes contextualism from assessor-relativism is that it takes
the truth-conditions of an utterance to be determined by some aspect of the
context of utterance. That is why contextualism and insensitive assessments
seem incompatible. But they are only incompatible given the following prin-
ciple, which is a standard background assumption in much semantic theory,
including the debate about insensitive assessments:
S-Assessment: When we assess utterances using various assess-
ment phrases, we normally (barring confusion, misunderstanding,
etc.) assess the satisfaction of their truth-conditions.4
2There are also linguistic phenomena that are less straightforwardly accounted for by
relativism. See von Fintel and Gillies (2008); for attempts to accommodate these and other
potentially troublesome phenomena within relativism, see MacFarlane (2008).
3Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009, ch. 4) suggest that a flexible traditional contextualist
semantics will be able to explain away many alleged cases of felicitous insensitive assess-
ments as actually being sensitive to the standard operative in the speaker context. Moreover,
on their account, actual cases of well-informed speakers expressing insensitive assessments
are examples of infelicitous assessments. To account for the prevalence of insensitive assess-
ments among reasonably competent speakers, they invoke some sort of error theory (ibid.,
p. 115–121). Our suggestion in this paper will be that contextualists can accept that (some)
such assessments are in perfect accord with linguistic practice and pragmatic purposes of
conversation.
4Our arguments are cast solely in terms of truth-conditions, while most of the current de-
bate over contextualism and relativism employs the distinction between propositional content
and circumstances of evaluation (following Kaplan 1981). We gain two things by sticking to
the less fine grained notion of truth-conditions. First, the presentation becomes much simpler
since a lot of side issues can thereby be ignored. Secondly, and more importantly, that our
main points can be stated and argued in purely truth-conditional terms proves that they hold
for all instances of relativism and contextualism that satisfy these general truth-conditional
characterizations.
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To accommodate insensitive assessments, contextualism needs a substitute
for S-Assessment. Of course, for most domains of discourse, S-Assessment
is a central and perfectly innocent assumption, which has gone largely un-
questioned.5 This doesn’t mean that it should be immune to revision, but
it means that contextualism needs a substitute that coincides with S-Assess-
ment for most domains but departs from it in the right way in cases of in-
sensitive assessments, and does so for non-ad hoc reasons. Preferably, the
substitution should force fewer changes to logic, semantics and pragmatics
than does relativism.
We think that there is a substitute that accomplishes just that, by introduc-
ing an element of context-dependence:
C-Assessment: When we assess utterances using various assess-
ment phrases, we normally (barring confusion, misunderstanding,
etc.) assess the satisfaction of the conditions that are made most
salient by the utterances in the context of assessment.
First, C-Assessment is likely to capture all the central and innocent cases
handled by S-Assessment. In normal cases of successful communication, an
utterance will make most salient the truth-conditions of the utterance. Sec-
ond, and for much the same reason, C-Assessment is not an ad hoc principle.
It is very plausible independently of the role we think it plays in accommo-
dating insensitive assessments in a contextualist, non-relativistic framework.
Third, it has other applications than the relativist’s favourite cases of insen-
sitive assessments:
(7) “I believe Anne did it.”
(8) “No, she couldn’t have.”
(9) “I was amazed how much healthier Bob looked.”
(10) “Yes, so was I.”
The “No” of (8) is presumably rejecting the claim that Anne did it, not the
claim that the speaker of (7) believes that she did it; the “Yes” of (10) is
presumably assessing the claim that Bob looked healthier or perhaps that it
is amazing how much healthier he looked, not the claim that the speaker of
(9) was amazed.6 Finally, C-Assessment accounts for what goes on in the
relativist’s cases of insensitive assessment. For example, in assessing Bill’s
5Kölbel (2009, p. 392) mentions it, but dismisses it without much discussion.
6Appealing to cases like (8) and (10), Kai von Fintel and Anthony Gillies (2008, pp. 82–
83) suggest that some insensitive assessments of might-P statements can be explained as
assessments of P (the keys are in the car), not of the full modal claim (the keys might be in
“04almer_bjornsson”
2009/12/12
page 368!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
368 ALEXANDER ALMÉR AND GUNNAR BJÖRNSSON
utterance, Emily is assessing whether the keys’ being in the car is compatible
with her information, not with Bill’s and Alice’s because that is the condition
that is made salient when Emily is assessing Bill’s utterance.
Substituting C-Assessment for S-Assessment provides a non-ad hoc ac-
commodation of insensitive assessments without the contortions of assess-
ment-relative truth. But it raises three important worries. First, it might
seem that assessing an utterance by assessing other truth-conditions than the
truth-conditions of the utterance must involve some kind of mistake or bad
faith. Second, it might seem that in disconnecting felicitous assessments of
utterances using phrases like “yes”, “no”, “that’s true” and so forth from the
truth-conditions of utterances, we lose grip on what the truth-conditions of
utterances are. Third, given C-Assessment and the existence of felicitous
insensitive assessments, it seems that we can end up saying that utterances
that are true are nevertheless felicitously assessed as false. That seems con-
tradictory. The following three sections address these worries.
The pragmatics of insensitive assessments
The first worry about C-Assessment is that assessing an utterance by as-
sessing the satisfaction of truth-conditions other than those of the utterance
would necessarily involve mistakes or bad faith. But whether it does, it
seems, must depend on the communicative purpose of such assessments: the
“public” purpose that governs such assessments and how addressees respond
to them. If speakers and hearers take insensitive assessments to be con-
cerned with the truth-conditions of the original utterance, mistakes or bad
faith would indeed be involved. What is striking about these assessments,
however, is that they are not concerned with assessing the (non-relative)
truth-conditions the satisfaction of which the speaker was concerned to get
across. Sam’s concern was to get across that fish sticks accorded with Sam’s
taste; John’s concern in assessing Sam’s utterance was to assess whether fish
sticks accorded with John’s taste. Bill’s concern was to get across that the
keys’ being in the car was compatible with what he (or he and Alice) knew
at the time; Emily’s concern was to state that it was incompatible with what
she knew. Given that this divergence of concerns is common knowledge,
insensitive assessments can be linguistically appropriate, involving no error
or slight of hand.
One might of course ask why we see this divergence of concerns in some
areas of discourse but not others. This, though, is everyone’s question;
the relativist needs an explanation of why utterances in these areas have
the car). We think that this covers at most a small sample of the cases that have impressed
relativists. (In particular, it won’t cover insensitive agreements.)
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assessment-relative truth-conditions. Nevertheless, it might be easier to un-
derstand C-Assessment given a brief sketch of our preferred answer to that
question, an answer equally available to relativists.7
We think that insensitive assessments are directed at utterance types such
that (i) there is rarely any point to expressing assessments of the truth-condi-
tions of such utterances and (ii) the utterances prompt attention to a closely
related condition the satisfaction of which is relevant to assess. For example,
relative to our primary interest in epistemic modals — as guides to action and
belief formation under uncertainty — we have no interest in a proposition’s
compatibility with bodies of information less complete than that accessible
to us at the time. For the purpose of directing our search for the keys, it is
simply irrelevant that their being in the car is compatible with some body
of information inferior to our own. This would be why, when Emily hears
Bill say that the keys might be in the car, Bill’s utterance makes most salient
the condition that the keys’ being in the car is compatible with information
accessible in Emily’s context. Similarly, since we tend to have privileged
access to our own personal taste, it is typically pointless to assess the truth of
expressions of personal taste, but frequently of interest to express one’s own
judgments of taste about the same thing. Though John probably understood
that Sam expressed that fish sticks accord with Sam’s taste, the assessment
worth expressing by John concerned whether fish sticks accord with John’s
taste.8
This is a mere sketch of a pragmatic explanation, but it suffices to clar-
ify the main point: that the communicative purpose of insensitive assess-
ments might be to move the conversation forward by assessing the satis-
faction of conditions other than those that the speaker was concerned to
get across, rather than to go back and assess the satisfaction of conditions
that concerned the speaker. If this purpose is understood by assessors and
7 For relativist attempts to explain the existence of why certain areas of discourse have
a relativistic semantics, see (Egan 2007; MacFarlane 2007). The explanation sketched here
is developed more fully in Almér and Björnsson (2009) and applied in Almér (2007) and
Björnsson & Finlay (2009).
8Although “X is tasty” and “It might be that X” admit or call for insensitive assessments,
the same isn’t true about “I like the taste of X” or “X is compatible with what we know”, even
though the truth-conditions the satisfaction of which the speaker is concerned to communi-
cate using the two sentences might be exactly the same. One of several possible explanations
for this difference is that only the latter involve a separate explicit term (“I”, “we”) specifi-
cally signifying the element that differs between the truth-conditions of the utterance and the
closely related truth-conditions involving the assessor rather than the speaker or parties of the
conversation, thus preserving the salience of the former truth-conditions in spite of pragmatic
pressures.
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their audience, there need not be any error or slight of hand involved. Rel-
ativists accommodate this phenomenon by introducing assessment-relative
truth-conditions for utterances; we have suggested that contextualists can
substitute C-Assessment for S-Assessment.
Utterance truth and speaker concerns
The second worry about C-Assessment was that the disconnect between
(a) felicitous assessments of utterances and (b) truth-conditions of the same
utterances removes our sense of what those truth-conditions are. To fully
take care of this worry, we would need an explicit characterization of the
truth-conditions of utterances; here, a clear enough outline of such a char-
acterization will have to suffice. One plausible suggestion is that the truth-
conditions of an utterance are those that guide its production and conversa-
tional uptake by addressees in normal cases of successful communication.
Typically, these will be the conditions that are tightly enough connected to
the lexical meaning of the sentence uttered and the satisfaction of which
speakers are concerned to get across to hearers. (Exactly how to identify
these conditions is of course a vexed issue involving the interplay of lexical
meaning and pragmatic processes that govern the determination of contex-
tually determined elements of truth-conditions, but the details are not im-
portant here.) As we saw in the previous section, these are just the sorts of
truth-conditions that come apart from what assessors are concerned with in
cases of felicitous insensitive assessments.
True but felicitously assessed as false
Given C-Assessment, some cases of insensitive assessment are cases where
true utterances are felicitously rejected or assessed as false. At a first glance,
that might look like a contradiction. However, everyone who is doing truth-
conditional semantics should distinguish between the semanticist’s notion
of utterance truth and the everyday uses of assessment phrases, including
“true”. Semantic analyses need to be cast in notions with stable theoretical
contents, but ordinary language typically adapts in flexible ways to vary-
ing communicative purposes depending on context. From the contextualist’s
perspective, cases where utterances are true in the semanticists sense but
felicitously rejected or called “false”, such as (2), (5) and (8), are merely
one among many examples of this. The semanticist’s notion of utterance
truth is geared towards explaining the production and conversational up-
take by addressees in normal cases of successful communication; everyday
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assessments of utterances are also often concerned with those very truth-
conditions, but sometimes direct our interest towards related but different
conditions.
Conclusion
We have argued that contextualist analyses can accommodate insensitive
assessments of the sort that has been taken to support assessor relativism.
To avoid unnecessary complications, we have ignored subtle differences be-
tween forms of contextualism or relativism that take contextually determined
elements (standards of taste, bodies of information) to be part of the contents
or propositions expressed by utterances, and those that take them to be part
of the circumstances relative to which we should evaluate the proposition
expressed when assessing the truth-value of the utterance.9 We have also
ignored a recent and very interesting attempt by Berit Brogaard (2008) to
give a contextualist account of insensitive assessments in moral discourse
by understanding contextually determined standards as part of the circum-
stances of evaluation and providing an intriguing account of indirect dis-
course. The reason for this is that the rationale for the contextualist strategy
developed here is independent of such details: by substituting C-Assessment
for S-Assessment, the contextualist achieves by local modification of seman-
tic theory what the relativist handles by introducing a relativistic notion of
utterance truth and modifying related central semantic notions. We take it
that, all else being equal, this is a reason to prefer a contextualist account.10
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